The use of comparator groups has to date been central to establishing a breach of s 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The New Zealand courts' approach to the formulation of comparator groups admits a lack of a clear methodology. This paper argues that, in the absence

I Introduction
Westen notoriously argued in his article, "The Empty Idea of Equality", that the concept of equality and by extension, principles of non-discrimination, lack moral content: 1
[C]ategories of morally alike objects do not exist in nature; moral alikeness is established only when people define categories. To say that people are morally alike is therefore to articulate a moral standard of treatment-a standard or rule specifying certain treatment for certain people-by reference to which they are, and thus are to be treated, alike.
That moral alikeness does not exist in nature does not render the causes of equality and non-discrimination at law meaningless. It does however demand that we pay closer attention to how we construct categories of (BORA). 4 The comparative approach is simple: the characteristics of X and Y differ only on a prohibited ground of discrimination. Where X has been treated differently to Y, it can be said that X has suffered differential treatment on a prohibited ground. Yet what appears to be an intuitive and common-sense approach has proved more fragile. neither provide a clear approach to the formulation of a comparator.
Following the Court of Appeal's decision in Ministry of Health v Atkinson
In Part II, this paper argues that the lack of a framework for the formulation of comparators permits arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making.
Particularly, potentially viable claims are prematurely excluded where courts intervene in the formulation of the comparator. The approach adopted in Atkinson and affirmed in CPAG goes some way to limiting the opportunity for premature exclusion, but does not go far enough.
Part III will examine the New Zealand courts' use of comparative methodology, and specifically the approach to formulating comparators.
Particular attention will be paid to B. 9 The formulation of the comparator in that case resulted in the premature exclusion of a claim, and is emblematic of the way in which the use of comparators can limit the scope of nondiscrimination provisions.
Substantive recommendations will be explored in Part IV. Departure from reliance upon the comparator as the exclusive means for the identification of differential treatment is desirable. In any event a firm bedrock of principle must underpin the methodology. Particularly, the choice of the comparator should be the prerogative of the claimant. Further, the question of differential treatment should be distinct from questions of causation. 
II Limitations of Comparator Reasoning
The rationale for the comparator derives from the apparently common-sense observation that discrimination can only be ascertained "by comparison with the condition of others" 10 -the court should be comparing "apples with apples". 11 As set out in the example given above, X and Y were in all respects alike but for the prohibited ground. Yet no two people are alike in all respects. If the ambition of the claim were refined, it could instead be said that X and Y are alike in all material respects. But without some framework for determining what characteristics are 'material', the latter formulation is no more helpful.
A 'treat likes alike' formulation relies on a series of underlying norms governing who can be considered alike. Westen, commenting on the Equal Protection clause of the US Constitution, argues that the notion of equality relies on background norms concerning which persons are to be seen as equal. In effect, "the equality formula presupposes anterior constitutional standards for ascertaining 'likeness' and 'unlikeness'." 12 In the New Zealand non-discrimination context, the norms to which Westen refers manifest themselves in the rationales that underlie courts' decisions about which comparator is appropriate.
The comparative methodology is in truth a vehicle for these norms, while appearing to be a neutral framework for identifying differential treatment.
The desire for apparent neutrality is not surprising, argues Goldman, as 
A Premature Justification
The first concern about the use of the comparator is that it can allow for the premature justification of alleged discrimination without sufficient scrutiny. 25 Haggie, above n 6, at 27.
Sufficient scrutiny
The tendency to import justification allows intuitive reactions to supplant sufficient scrutiny. Without any framework that governs who can be compared to whom, the enquiry becomes driven by instinct. The inherent flexibility of the exercise allows it to "slip into arbitrary and inconsistent reasoning" 26 which provides the appearance, but not substance, of analysis.
Where a case concerns "discrimination which is regarded as 'normal'" or 'acceptable', 27 the belief that the practice in question does not deserve to be labelled discrimination encourages the formulation of a comparator that incorporates the discriminatory circumstances.
Returning again to the example of tax-credits above, while opinion certainly differs, many would consider such differential treatment 'acceptable' in the context of social welfare policy. If that intuition is controlling, the outcome may be that different financial needs becomes accepted as the reason for denying comparability. The determination concerning comparability has then effectively hidden an intuitive determination that the practice is justifiable, and subjects the claimant to the caprice of the fact-finder's beliefs about what is 'acceptable'. In this vein, the Court of Appeal in
Atkinson noted that justification ought be confined to a later enquiry to "avoid decision-making based on instinct rather than analysis."
28
The concern about the role of intuition is amplified by the way that it replaces further scrutiny. If it is determined that the claimant cannot be compared with the proposed comparator the claim can proceed no further.
In that case the impugned policy or practice will not be subject to scrutiny under s 5 or the relevant provisions for justification or defence. The task of a court is to select the comparator which best fits the statutory scheme in relation to the particular ground of discrimination which is in issue, taking full account of all facets of the scheme, including particularly any defences made available to the person against whom discrimination is alleged. A comparator which is appropriate in one setting may produce a completely inapt result in another. It will certainly do so if it effectively deprives part of the statutory scheme of its operation.
The relevance of this direction to the interpretation of s 19 is limited in light of the fact that it concerned a case under the ERA. It has, though, been read more broadly to be of relevance in cases brought under s 19 and so its meaning is of significance.
The observation comprises two operative parts. First, that the comparator should be shaped by the statutory scheme and, second, that a comparator will be inappropriate if it deprives the statutory scheme of its operation. The import of both parts is contingent on the proper meaning of "statutory scheme." The phrase could have been referring to the statutory scheme under which the claim was brought (the narrow interpretation). Conversely, it could be taken to refer to the impugned scheme where the claim alleges that a statutory scheme is discriminatory (the broad interpretation).
The broad interpretation is undesirable because it allows questions of justification to be imported into the comparator exercise. It lends credence to the intuition that the rationales of the impugned scheme -in effect, the discriminatory circumstances-have a role to play in the formation of the comparator. Moreover, the narrow interpretation ought to be preferred simply because it seems more plausible: all discrimination claims will necessarily be brought under statutory schemes given that nondiscrimination provisions are contained in statutes, but not all discrimination claims will allege that a statutory scheme is discriminatory. Further, the reference to defences suggests that the observation concerns the nondiscrimination provisions under which discrimination has been alleged. comparator. 61 The Court of Appeal's approach as it was framed could be said to not formally offend the direction in Atkinson and CPAG to exclude matters of justification from the s 19 enquiry, 62 though in substance it does.
The Court of Appeal adopted the limited comparator in part because it was thought to provide a better picture of whether the alleged discrimination was on the basis of the prohibited ground-it permitted "a focus on the true role of that factor". 63 So formally the outcome could be ascribed to a determination that the treatment was not on the basis of a prohibited ground, rather than an incorporation of justification. Justification is, though, its effect. Where the intuition is that there is a plausible alternative explanation for the differential treatment, formulating the comparator to assess whether the treatment was on the basis of a prohibited ground can function as justification. (1) Couple A are in a same sex de facto relationship; (2) Couple B are married, in a civil union or opposite sex de facto relationship; (3) Couple A and B's circumstances are in all material respects identical. However, Couple A were treated more favourably than Couple B solely because they were in a same sex de facto relationship.
This is a mirror comparator. The only difference between the hypothetical claimants Couple A and the comparator Couple B is the ground of discrimination: marital status. Mirror comparators are not per se inappropriate-sometimes the mirror of the claimant makes for an apt comparison, but not because it is a mirror. 75 The reliance on this example locked the process into a search for a mirror comparison of B: if the example comparator is undisputed and is a mirror of the hypothetical claimant then nothing less will suffice for the actual comparison the claimant seeks.
The problems that begin with the misleading example are exacerbated by subsequent adoption of the broad interpretation of the McAlister dicta suggesting that the ideal comparator is that which "best fits the statutory scheme." 76 Collins J appears to interpret this as a direction to mould the comparator to the contours of the impugned scheme, rather than the nondiscrimination provisions under which the claim has been brought, adopting what was above termed the broad interpretation.
B's proposed comparator (a single person) was rejected on the grounds that such a formulation "ignores the statutory scheme and purpose of the Act and Regulations which are reflected by the lawmaker's view that couples ... comingle their assets and ought be treated as a combined unit rather than two individuals when assessing the nature of the disposed assets." 77 As such are determined to not be sufficiently alike because the rationale underlying the policy is reason to not consider them alike. Entertaining the legislative purpose during the formulation of the comparator leads to the incorporation of justification at the comparator stage. That, as discussed above, Collins J expects the comparator methodology to comprise both identification and justification 79 might go some way to explain his conclusion that, in light of the purpose of the Act and regulations, there is no plausible comparator.
Certainly there are situations where a lawmaker's view is patently unreasonable. Returning to Collins J's example comparator, the law maker's view that same-sex de facto couples ought to be treated differently would surely not have sufficed as reason to consider them incomparable with couples in other forms of relationship. The controlling difference appears to be that the form of discrimination at issue in B falls within the bounds of differential treatment that is considered 'acceptable'. The scheme was discriminatory: it did disadvantage Mrs B by differential treatment on grounds of family status. It might however be justifiable discrimination. But the flexibility of the methodology allowed the comparator exercise to serve as cover for the intuitive conclusion that this kind of differential treatment is not deserving of being described as discrimination. particularly where it is possible to form a mirror comparison. 103 A mirror comparison produces a very strong inference that the differential treatment was on the proscribed ground and all but obviates the need to consider causation. But where a mirror comparison is not possible, it is necessary to decouple the issue of whether the differential treatment was on the prohibited ground from the issue of whether there was differential treatment at all. 104 Once the claimant has established differential treatment as regards their proposed comparator, it can then be asked whether the prohibited ground was "material" 105 to the differential treatment.
IV Reformulating the Comparator
106
Requiring that questions of causation be addressed separately avoids allowing for intuitive determinations that the alternate explanations for differential treatment prevent comparability. In CPAG it was acknowledged that in cases where multiple criteria operated in concert to produce the allegedly discriminatory outcome, or where effects-based discrimination was at issue, a focus on whether the discrimination was "on the basis of the prohibited ground" may be necessary. The effect of these recommendations is to lower the de facto threshold to establishing a differential treatment by ensuring a neutral conception of discrimination. Huscroft has misgivings that such an approach allows for any differential treatment accompanied by disadvantage to be described as discrimination, which "may end up trivialising" rather than protecting the right to freedom from discrimination. 108 Similarly, Haggie expresses concern that the low threshold established by the Court of Appeal in
Atkinson leads to "uncomfortable questions" about precedent: findings of prima facie discrimination that are justifiable under s 5 might trivialise the idea of discrimination.
109
Trivialisation might occur where policies or practices that make justifiable distinctions between people were found unlawful. But such a determination would require that a court find them unable to survive scrutiny under s 5, at which point it is no longer 'trivial'. It should be recalled that a prima facie finding of discrimination is not determinative, and any stigma of a prima facie finding is the unavoidable consequence of a "general rule from which exceptions are allowed." 110 108 Huscroft, above n 17, at 376. 109 Haggie, above n 6, at 45. 110 McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 2, at [55] per Tipping J.
But such a claim might also hide less laudable value-judgements about the appropriate scope of non-discrimination provisions. Haggie's "uncomfortable" example concerns whether a parent who chose to care for a child at home where a daycare funding was available would succeed in establishing a breach of s 19 in a manner similar to the claimants in
Atkinson.
111 Perhaps the 'gut reaction' that the effect of such a scheme cannot be "true discrimination" 112 should not be trusted. There might be a legitimate concern that the burden of unpaid family responsibilities disproportionately affects women. The merits of that concern might stand fully revealed if subject to scrutiny under s 5. Relying on a 'gut reaction' that such is not the case is somewhat less educative.
Beyond trivialisation, Huscroft also expresses the pragmatic concern that the state will be overburdened by defending claims of discrimination if the threshold is too low. Admittedly, the operation of state requires differential treatment. 113 Yet the State has also committed itself to refrain from differentiating between persons on limited number of grounds. Where it breaches that commitment it must be called to account for why it has chosen to do so. The unavoidable power-imbalance between the claimant and the State demands that the latter should be willing to bear a larger burden in discrimination proceedings. It is desirable to adopt a "broad approach" to the role of comparators 114 
V Conclusion
Comparators can be a useful tool in assessing whether differential treatment has occurred. Nonetheless, the method tends to encourage justification of differential treatment in absence of sufficient scrutiny. The instructions to exclude matters of justification from the comparator stage adopted in
Atkinson and CPAG go some way to ameliorating the risk of premature justification. But so long as the courts continue to modify or reject claimants' comparators on the grounds that they are insufficiently alike, the risk of excluding otherwise viable claims at an early stage remains.
Deferring to the claimant's choice of comparator avoids allowing matters of justification to prematurely exclude the claim. Separating the question of whether there has been differential treatment from whether that treatment was on a prohibited ground prevents the comparison from being confused with issues of causation.
Recalling Westen's observation that to "say that people are morally alike is therefore to articulate a moral standard of treatment", 116 it must be admitted that intuition and value-judgements will have some role to play in discrimination claims-such allows the provisions to adapt over time. The risk, though, is borne out by our history. 
